

VALUE OF USING
NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS AND EURATOM
AS
VEHICLES FOR INSTITUTING
PEER REVIEWS AND UNIFORM SECURITY STANDARDS

Introductory Remarks

Crises generally are a trigger for improving behaviours, organization and induce a more global approach to security concerns. (e.g. security of supply, health security, civil security, security or protection against major natural hazards).

Three different types of crises have affected the nuclear sector since the beginning of the 21st century; the non-proliferation crises with North Korea, Libya and Iran, the safety impact of the tsunami at the Fukushima nuclear power plant site and the 9/11 unprecedented and unthinkable terrorist attack that shed the light on the risk of “nuclear terrorism” although was not connected to a nuclear plant.

All these crises led to intense reflection and cooperation at the international level, and resulted in different initiatives and improvement.

In the nuclear field, security may be seen in a very broad sense and encompass safety, safeguards and non-proliferation concerns. This paper will focus on security defined “The prevention and detection of and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear or other radioactive substances or their associated facilities”, and not on the broad political aspects and discussions about disarmament, or anti-terrorist measures.

In this rather limited definition of nuclear security some progress have been made recently within the international framework, but certainly more remains to be done if the objective is to harmonize safety and security responses at the international level.

In particular, it is interesting to examine if peer reviewing and uniform security standards may be achieved in this domain where sovereignty, confidentiality and security consideration have so far limited international cooperation.

It is also interesting, and this is the focus of this paper, to examine to what extent Euratom and bilateral agreements could best serve this purpose.

Before trying to assess the value of Euratom or bilateral cooperation agreements for

understand where we come from, what is today's situation and what really mean peer reviews and uniform security standards.

I. The historical context of international cooperation on security issues; Euratom, IAEA and the International Convention on Physical Protection

EURATOM

Nuclear security is not covered as such by Euratom although some reference to security or rather to physical protection is generally made in bilateral Agreements between Euratom and its partners.

The Euratom Treaty dates back to 1957, a period when the situation was different from today's on many points; first, nuclear facilities were very few and mostly related to research or to military purposes. Second, these facilities were Community or State-owned and managed. Third, and though some security risks were acknowledged, the main concern was the risk of theft during the transportation of nuclear material between two facilities and particularly between two different countries, involving sometimes crossing several borders. At that time the perception of risks linked to nuclear terrorism and sabotage was far less acute than it is today.

Also, since the responsibility on nuclear security and safety were both recognized as national responsibilities, belonging to the sphere of sovereignty of Member States, no explicit reference to the common and current understanding of safety or security is made in the Euratom Treaty¹.

Some Member States challenged the participation of Euratom to the CPPNM negotiation and the debate over Community competences was finally decided by a decision of the European Court of Justice in 1978. However Euratom had to define its specific competences that were shared with member States and those which were exclusively falling under Members States' responsibility.

¹ The Euratom Treaty was only translated from the original version to English prior to the accession of the UK in 1978. A few but very significant translating choices may lead to misunderstandings on the community competences. For instance the English version refers to "security" (section 3 of chapter 2, dissemination of information) while the original French version is more appropriately titled "provisions concerning secrecy," Chapter 3 is rather misleadingly called "Health and Safety" in the English version while the French text refers to "health protection". Conversely the French version of the Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty refers to "contrôle de sécurité" which really corresponds to the English version of "safeguards", but in 1978 the Court of Justice has judged that this term was really referring to a broader approach of security that did encompass "security" within the meaning of the CPPNM.

The IAEA

The IAEA Statute that is contemporaneous to the Euratom Treaty does refer to safety standards but not to security standards, for the same reasons as mentioned in the case of Euratom. However this did not prevent IAEA to develop numerous guidance and texts to support and assist States ' responsibilities and endeavours in this field. For instance INFCIRC 225, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, was first published in 1975 and regularly amended², IAEA a Code of Conduct and various specific technical reference documents and recommendations that all contribute forming what can be described as "soft law". In addition, IAEA proposes inspection missions called IPPAS (see below).

The International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM)

CPPNM was signed on March 3rd 1980 and did only concern material during transport and not materials in facilities or the facilities themselves. Again, the reason for this is the recognition that each State is responsible (or should be responsible) of its security in all fields, including nuclear. Moreover, most States were really opposed to any international interference with their security affairs.

However, with the development of the nuclear energy and the expansion of trade in nuclear material and fuel, nuclear supplier states became more and more concerned by their responsibility and wanted to ensure the protection of materials including in facilities in the countries of destination. In 1999, emerged the idea of reviewing the CPPNM to enlarge its scope and a working group was set up by IAEA Director General in 2001 to work on a project amendment.

States that were mainly importers of material and fuels were rather reluctant to the extension of the scope of the CPPNM proposed under the United States leadership. They perceived this extension as an inappropriate and intrusive instrument.

Despite certain resistance to this evolution, and after the shock of the 9/11 attack, the amendment was formally finalized in 2005 but still needs to be approved by a majority of 2/3 of the Parties in order to enter into force.

The main items contained in the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM relate to the:

- Extension of physical protection measures on nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport,
- Protection of nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage.
- Promotion and facilitation of cooperation among States and the IAEA to locate and recover stolen nuclear material.
- Introduction of 12 principles

² INFCIRC 225 was revised in 1977, 1989, 1993, and 1998 and again in January 2011. It is referred to as INFCIRC 225rev5

II. Peer reviews, security standards and best practices for nuclear security

Peer reviews

A common definition of *Peer review* may be the evaluation of creative work or performance by other people in the same field in order to maintain or enhance the quality of the work or performance in that field¹.

Peer reviews are often seen as an efficient confidence building measure especially when performed at an international level and with experts that may have competing interests or agendas. If peer reviews suppose a common set of criteria to ensure objectivity of the findings, they are not necessarily based on standards. They may be seen as a more comprehensive approach to security or safety improvement than the simple verification of compliance to standards.

Indeed the IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review Service) missions which are peer reviews organized by the IAEA are carried out « through consideration of both regulatory, technical and policy issues, with comparisons against IAEA safety standards and, where appropriate, good practices elsewhere »³.

IRRS are performed in the field of safety, including radiation protection, and are designed to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the national nuclear regulatory infrastructure of States, while recognizing the ultimate responsibility of each State to ensure safety.

In the security area, Integrated Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) was created by the IAEA to assist States in strengthening their national nuclear security regime. IPPAS provides peer advice on implementing international instruments, and Agency guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities.

During the IPPAS mission, the State's physical protection system is reviewed and compared with international guidelines ([INFCIRC/225/Rev.5](#)) and internationally recognized best practices. Based on this review, recommendations for improvements are provided including follow-up activities and assistance. Following IPPAS recommendations, actual upgrades of physical protection systems are sometimes initiated in Member States through bilateral support programmes (see appendix for further details on IPPAS).

This short description of the IPPAS and IRRS missions show they are both intended to pursue the same objective but unlike the IRRS, the IPPAS are based on guidelines and best practices since no specific standard exists, unlike in the safety area.

³ See IEA website <http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/>

Another major difference to be noted between the use of peer review in safety and security fields is that unlike the CPPMN, the Safety Convention obliges Parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for "peer review" at meetings of the Parties to be held at the IAEA. This mechanism was seen as the main innovative and dynamic element of the Convention compared to previous Conventions.

Uniform security standards

A common definition states « Standards are normally produced by specific organizations that have been designated by a government or industry to do so, using a formal process to draft, review and approve procedures that are then designated as requirements in order to be approved or licensed to conduct specific operations. »

In the nuclear world, it belongs to IAEA to set standards which are designed to be implemented by States regulatory authorities.

As M. K. Becker wrote; “Obviously, redundancy in standardization efforts by international organizations has to be avoided.” In 1981, ISO and IAEA signed a "Memorandum of Understanding between IAEA and ISO". “This defines the areas of mutual responsibilities as follows: The ISO recognizes the responsibilities of the IAEA in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, in particular with regard to the establishment or adoption of standards of safety for the protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property (development of basic safety standards, specialized regulations, codes of practice and safety guides) which are primarily addressed to national regulatory bodies....”⁴

The IAEA safety standards is described as a system based on three layers and reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The IAEA safety standards are applicable throughout the entire lifetime of facilities and activities – existing and new – utilized for peaceful purposes, and to protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks (IAEA website)

As far as security is concerned, no such “standards” formally exist

If we draw a parallel between safety and security, it can be said that the fundamental safety principles are replicated in the CPPNM 2005 amendment with the 12 principles and in the nuclear security Fundamentals. They explain the rationale for what could be security standards for government and regulatory.

However what is published as “safety requirements “(general and specific) is named “ recommendations “ in the security field. Recommendations are based on the Principles and are meant to assist Member States for the establishment, in a harmonized manner, of their national regulatory Framework and security guides.

⁴ K. Becker, Nuclear Standards programme of ISO, IAEA Bulletin vol.25 N°3

Best or good practices in nuclear security

A current definition describes **best practice** (or good practice) as a method or technique that has consistently shown results superior to those achieved with other means, and that is used as a benchmark. In addition, a "best" practice can evolve to become better as improvements are discovered. Best practice is often used to describe the process of developing and following a standard way of doing things that multiple organizations can use.

Best practices are used to maintain quality as an alternative to mandatory legislated standards and can be based on self-assessment or benchmarking.

Applied to nuclear security, best practices are usually designated to mean a set of effective (improved performance) and/or efficient (less costly) methods that have been identified and documented by a group of experienced nuclear security practitioners and that have wide application and replication to all countries with nuclear programmes.

Best practices are neither standards nor requirements. Best practices may in some cases be referenced and used as guidance for a specific topic. Their importance is as tools to consider using when striving for continual improvement in nuclear security.

Best practices should offer a comprehensive approach to security needs; an adequate assessment of the threat, (DBT) and include deterrence, detection of any attempt, delay, response, and mitigation in case an attack would not be defeated by the redundant, defence in depth approach. Mitigation is also part of the deterrence concept, and should be taken in consideration when evaluating the threat and its consequences.

III. Main obstacles in getting peer reviews and standards internationally accepted in the nuclear security field

The description of the concepts and historical context is of relevance to understanding the rather slow and shy process of international cooperation in the field of nuclear security. The main obstacles to further international commitments and exposure are:

1/ Peer reviews suppose transparency that contradicts the need of confidentiality or secrecy in the sake of security; detailing your security arrangements to an international assembly may be helping the enemy to detect your weaknesses and defeat your protection measures.

2/Standardization suppose some rigidity (uniform measures, heavy and lengthy process) that contradicts the need of adaptation to events and situations. The specificity of each country's regulatory, political, administrative even military organization and culture are difficult to be factored in standards. Nuclear security as any security measure is more to be assessed as part of a system and should not be taken in isolation. States may fear to be judged in a partial manner and to have to comply with inadequate norms. The situation (DBT, organization, culture) differs from one country to another; one set of measures may prove inappropriate in one country while it is most efficient in another.

3/The sovereignty issue is not to be neglected; States are rather reluctant to enter in a process that could be perceived as intrusive and « imperialist » with some countries deciding what is best for themselves.

The declaration of the French delegation at the plenary session of the conference to consider adoption of the proposal amending the CPPNM is very significant and points out the reluctance to accept peer reviews, mandatory reports and the compulsory nature of the recommendations contained in INFCIRC 225 that would be turned into “standards”.

The French delegates states that the working group considered certain provisions should be excluded “ military nuclear material and activities, regular reports by State Parties on the application of the Convention, peer review of the level of physical protection applied to a State Party, the legally binding nature of INFCIRC 225. “ He adds “ What was envisageable for the Convention on nuclear safety was not the case on nuclear security”⁵.

The Institute for Nuclear Material Management (INMM), which has promoted extensive discussion on these issues, illustrates these difficulties when discussing the response aspects. INMM indicates, « Nation States and nuclear activities conducted by States require substantial flexibility to implement practices that are appropriate for their unique circumstances. » and recommends to « seek creative, cooperative ways to mitigate states' concerns, including costs, national sovereignty concerns, and fear of disclosing sensitive national security information »⁶.

⁵ <http://ebookbrowse.com/cppnm-ac-plen-sr1-english-pdf-d253821259>

⁶ INMM “Global best Practices for Physical Protection http://www.inmm.org/Physical_Protection.htm

IV. Euratom specific role and the value of bilateral cooperation agreements in promoting peer reviews and standards or best practices

In this context what are the specific attributes and achievements of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), or bilateral agreements?

In order to overcome the reluctance of States to allow more transparency in their arrangements and organization, it is important to build confidence in the process and its evolution, it is important they trust the peer review team, it is important they are ensured of some reciprocity.

EURATOM attributes and achievements

Euratom as a community supports in many ways the development of a security culture at the EU level. The EU structure, the Joint Research Centre and training undertakings facilitate exchanges between experts and researchers, promote mobility, and thus contribute to reinforcing common understanding and trust while acknowledging cultural differences.

Although the Euratom Treaty as such has not developed a legal framework in the field of security comparable to that of safety, two initiatives or achievements need to be mentioned to assess the perspectives of Euratom's evolution and its contribution to strengthening the international system.

First, a rather confidential but solid network has developed within European countries in the last 10 years. Some Euratom countries decided to replicate the West European nuclear regulators association (WENRA) in the safety field⁷, and created the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA), in 2004.

Currently, the regulatory bodies of the following states are members of the ENSRA: Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

The objectives of the ENSRA are:

- to facilitate confidential exchange on nuclear security matters
- to provide the IAEA and other official bodies with a source of expert advice
- to develop a comprehensive understanding of the fundamental principles of physical

⁷ WENRA was created in 1999 as a network of Chief Regulators of EU countries with nuclear power plants and Switzerland. Its main are to develop a common approach to nuclear safety, to provide an independent capability to examine nuclear safety in applicant countries and to be a network of chief nuclear safety regulators in Europe exchanging experience and discussing significant safety issues.

protection

- to promote and achieve a common approach in nuclear security within Europe
- to establish professional competence in the field of nuclear security.

ENSRA is certainly an asset for Euratom countries to contribute to international cooperation in security issues and defining possible international standards in this field.

Second, EURATOM has set up an Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS) after the Fukushima accident.

The European Council of 25 March 2011 reacted after the Fukushima accident and decided, "the safety of all EU nuclear power plants (NPPs) should be reviewed, on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment which is now referred to as "stress tests".

In May 2011, the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) and the Commission agreed that a two-track process should be put in place to cover the safety and the security. The scope and modalities of the safety track were agreed and the tests officially started on 1 June 2011. The preliminary outcome of this work was reported to the European Council of 9 December 2011. To take forward the security track a new Presidency-chaired was created on 21 July 2011. The mandate given to the group was to deal with "security of the NPPs in EU in relation to theft, sabotage, unauthorised access, unauthorised movement of nuclear material or other malicious act."

In contrast to the safety track of the "stress tests", the work of AHGNS on the security track has not dealt with specific NPPs nor has it discussed Member States' special characteristics but has concentrated - according to the mandate – on methods for evaluating, taking preventive measures and protecting NPPs. The goal of the work of AHGNS has been to identify and share good practices and consider possible ways to improve general security principles based on the nuclear security recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The preliminary outcome of the work in AHGNS was reported in an interim rapport submitted to the European Council of 9 December 2011 but was not disclosed.

The final report, issued in May 2012, does not contain classified information and was made public.⁸

One of the interesting contributions of this work is the annex 1 to the report. This annex describes 32 "good practices" listed into 5 categories and relate to; national legal and regulatory framework, national security framework, design basis threat, nuclear security culture, contingency planning.

Although the security of NPP's is a national responsibility, the AHGNS, on the basis of its main conclusions, proposes the following recommendations:

⁸ See AHGNS report : <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st10/st10616.en12.pdf>

- Urge all EU Member States, which have not yet done it to complete as soon as possible the internal process that would enable the deposit of their instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM. This will also set a good example for neighbouring countries and bring closer the date for the Amendment to enter into force.
- Encourage the use of IAEA's services and the use and implementation of IAEA's publications of the Nuclear Security Series in the Member States' national practices.
- Highly encourage the use of IAEA's IPPAS missions on a regular basis in all EU Member States with NPPs. Security issues relating to cyber threat should be part of the missions. EU Member States hosting an IPPAS mission also send an important message to other countries to do similarly.
- Encourage the IAEA to share, at the international level, best practices identified through the different IPPAS missions, taking due account of confidentiality requirements. The implementation of such best practices should be promoted.
- Encourage regular cooperation among EU Member States and between them and the EU's neighbouring countries. The cross-border nature of any nuclear incident is a strong motivation for close cooperation and exchange of information between countries.
- Continue the work on nuclear security among EU Member States, also in line with Action RN. 19 of the EU CBRN Action Plan. The AHGNS is convinced that continued cooperation between the EU Member States, including appropriate information exchange, on nuclear security is of value, using the framework of existing groups at the EU level. ENSRA is considered as an important body for enhancing nuclear security. The AHGNS calls upon this association to welcome nuclear security regulators of all EU Member States and those of neighbouring countries.

These recommendations are really supporting and promoting the publications, elements of standardization, missions and other actions of the IAEA in the field. It specifically calls for an implementation of IPPAS missions to all EU NPPs as a way to set the example for all nations.

These initiatives already constitute a major support to the expanded practice of peer reviews in nuclear security and to the building of "standards", although they may be of a slightly different nature than those in the safety field.

EURATOM's influence

Euratom represents a unique community of States that includes 27 countries, with over the third of the nuclear energy output worldwide in 2011, it represents the largest number of Nuclear power plants and other fuel cycle facilities and probably the most diversified types of facilities in any region. For this reason, a common Policy or move towards enforcing legislation or encouraging peer reviews will affect a large number of governments and will cover a large number of facilities worldwide, contributing to strengthening the system.

Second the Euratom member states constitute together a major exporter of nuclear fuel and technology and this provides an opportunity to convince or press upon customer countries and

through the NSG the adoption of good practices and acceptance of IPPAS missions or even other bilateral exchanges.

Third, Euratom countries behaviour and posture vis-à-vis the furthering of an international governance in nuclear security are likely to set the example and support the elaboration and enforcement of international criteria or norms if not of standards.

It is interesting indeed to consider the Euratom tools to enforce or promote the effective implementation of agreed upon criteria or standards. The main legislative tools of the EU are the regulation and the Directive.

While the EU regulation is directly applicable to member States and to the citizens, without needing national laws, the Directive sets the objectives to be attained and each State is responsible for transcribing the Directive into its national legislation. However, the Commission is responsible for verifying the actual and proper transcription of the Directive and has a set of tools from warning to sanctions, which may be supported by the European court of Justice decision, to actually implement the different measures adopted by all member States in the Directive.

This tool has been used to set a harmonized approach to safety. In 2009, the Council of the European Union adopted the Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. This Directive provides binding legal force to the main international nuclear safety principles. With this Directive, the European Commission may impose sanctions in case a Member State would have inadequately transposed the Directive into its national law. The legally binding aspect of the Directive and the sanction tool are two important ways to reinforce and supplement the commitments taken by each State under the safety Convention.

BILATERAL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement involve two States that have a common interest in cooperating and that usually respect one of the basic principle of international law, that is reciprocity.

Like the Euratom framework, bilateral agreements constitute favourable tools to promote cooperation in security issues. The need for confidence and trust, for recognizing cultural, administrative or other specificity and the need of equal treatment are naturally granted in those bilateral agreements if they are negotiated on an equal footing between two real partners.

Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements have multiplied over the years with the development of nuclear trade and the perspective of a nuclear renaissance, or at least an expansion of nuclear to other countries.

This is the result of national requirements concerning cooperation in the nuclear field, or multinational commitment taken, for instance within the Nuclear Suppliers' Group.

One main value of introducing provisions relating to security in bilateral agreements is to strengthen the commitments.

Bilateral agreements that are International Treaties can support the “legalization “ of more political statements and ensure a higher status (duration of the commitment, possible compliance verification, sanctions).

The NSG that refers to INFCIRC 225 is a political commitment and it is not legally binding. The CPPNM is the main legally binding tool (there are also the UN resolution) in the area of nuclear security. But as we have seen, for some reasons, the 2005 amendment process did not end up with imposing regular peer reviews on the States Parties. If there is a reasonable consensus in the future to further amend this Convention in view of strengthening the peer review requirement or putting the IPPAS missions as a mandatory task, the negotiation process will be long and the ratification and entry into force will certainly be postponed. However, if States are ready to accept making IPPAS missions or bilateral peer reviews based on the IAEA fundamental principles and recommendations or on the good or best practice identified by the AHGNS, they could take the opportunity of renewing their bilateral agreements, or propose their partner to amend them so as to be legally committed to observing the recommendations and accepting IPPAS missions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The development of International cooperation in nuclear security is faced with some real obstacles and but the growing awareness of the possible global effects of a poor security in one country and of the responsibility of suppliers and partners should allow some evolution while recognizing some need for confidentiality, differentiation and the prime responsibility of States.

The main legal text, the CPPNM will be strengthened when the 2005 amendment will be in force. However even thus improve, there will not be compulsory international peer reviews based on “standards”.

One way to encourage systematic, regular voluntary or compulsory international peer reviews of security arrangements or to promote some sort of “standards” or accepted best practices in nuclear security is through Euratom and the bilateral agreements. Euratom in its complexity has already proven to be a major support of peer reviewing in the safety but also in the security fields.

The regional and legal structure of Euratom as well as the diversity of members states, the number and diversity of nuclear facilities contribute to granting European Member States a specific role in advancing the global awareness of nuclear security imperatives and possibilities to benefit from international cooperation.

If all Member States were to decide that it is worthwhile harmonizing their security system, and thus encouraging other countries to accept peer reviews of at least their organizational

system (and not the effective implementation of specific measures to their facilities) they could agree on a directive that could impose such peer reviews.

They would turn peer reviews, based on the 12 principles of the CPPNM amendment and the IAEA recommendations into a regular and mandatory process.

In other words, EU members could promote this idea of mandatory peer reviews by setting the example in Europe.

As far as uniform standards are concerned, Euratom countries may adopt common good practices and agree for their application in the EU thus showing the way to global standards based on IAEA's recommendations.

Nuclear safety and security are both recognized to fall under the prime responsibility of States but States are increasingly aware of their mutual benefit in enhancing international cooperation. Unlike in the safety field, a full harmonization of security measures may not be appropriate but common approaches, common objectives and principles even some standards and norms, sharing of best practices and peer reviews may be carried out while protecting sensitive information. Different stakeholders should cooperate, different tools such as regional associations (ENSRA), Institutes (WINS) are of great value in building trust and forging best practices. Other tools like Euratom or bilateral treaties and agreements are of specific value, in particular in legalizing political or voluntary commitments.

APPENDIX

The IPPAS missions

At the request of a Member State, IPPAS assembles a team of international experts who assess the State's system of physical protection, compare it with international best practices and make recommendations for improvements. IPPAS missions are conducted both on a nation-wide and facility-specific basis.

The mission objectives are two-fold:

- Help States translate international instruments on nuclear security and IAEA guidance into regulatory requirements for the design and operation of physical protection systems.
- Provide State bodies and facilities with new concepts and discuss best practices on physical protection with experts from other countries.

IPPAS team members draft a report for the host country during the mission. This highly confidential document details the results, acknowledges good practices and lists recommendations and suggestions for improvement at the state and operational level. The report is shared only with the host State. It addresses the following key issues:

- Government organization: competent authorities and their security responsibilities;
- Physical protection legislation;
- Regulations;
- Licensing and inspections;
- Integration of other organizations; and
- Facility implementation of physical protection measures.

On the basis of host inputs, the IAEA assembles an international expert team and outlines the conduct of mission. The State assembles nuclear security documents for IPPAS team review (legislations, regulations, guidance and nuclear security plans).

The team meets with appropriate government and facility personnel and gathers, discusses and shares information about physical protection. A draft report is presented to the host at the exit briefing outlining the results and recommendations of the expert team.

The host's comments are incorporated, and a final confidential report is issued.

Agreed follow-up activities are undertaken by the host and the IAEA, as soon as is practical. At the request of the host, follow-up activities may include:

- Staff training and related human resources development;
- Development of physical protection regulations and laws; and
- Improvement of physical protection systems.

A follow-up mission reviews implementation of IPPAS recommendations and advice concerning physical protection for a facility. This follow-up mission would usually be within five years.